Geographies of Justice
Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito has argued that 'the domain of law is gaining terrain both domestically and internationally'; he continued, 'the process of normativisation is investing increasingly wider spaces'.
1 As the introduction to this issue maintains, this (legal) domain carries with it a particular ontology that is reinforced through its increased uptake by actors at the domestic and international levels in response to mass atrocity.
When acts of violence are described as crimes, this designation carries a set of assumptions about agency, responsibility, and appropriate forms for redressing suffering.
As more terrain is captured for law and subjected to its particular logics -especially legal ontologies that focus on retributive forms -other ways of conceptualising responses to conflict are sidelined or considered inadequate when measured against its dominant terms. 2 As the field of international criminal law expanded in the post-Cold War period, it presented a contrasting paradigm to negotiated political settlements and truth commissions. 3 Its focus on individualised responsibility for mass crimes reflects liberal legalist understandings of how causality operates in conflict settings; here the Nuremberg tribunal's famous assertion that crimes are committed by 'men, not by abstract entities' is one of the underlying premises of the field. 4 The spread of international criminal law has produced unprecedented forms of what one diplomatic proponent of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has termed 'international judicial intervention'. 5 The ICC Rome
Statute's preamble claims that 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished', suggesting that 'ending impunity' ought to serve as a moral imperative in states affected by mass conflict. 6 The terms through which international criminal law operates suggest that the field works through cosmopolitan and apolitical consensus, unified by a collective desire to bring what Walter Benjamin calls 'the great criminal' before the law, a figure whose violence is seen to threaten the very foundations of the legal order. 7 The field presents the international community as the agent of these interventions, though this 'imagined community' 8 is a rhetorical construct rather than a determinate body of states. Invoking the international community as its agent is meant to imbue the ICC's actions with moral force and political legitimacy. International judicial interventions are thought to be undertaken on behalf of a cosmopolitan constituency and in the interest of the global good rather than reflecting the interests of particular political actors. As prosecutors at the ICC have repeatedly emphasised, they are 'solely guided by the law' 9 ; the current prosecutor contended that 'politics have no place and will play no part in the decisions I take'.
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The theoretical construction of international criminal law as a collective project of the international community, devoid of political interests and embracing the moral call to 'end impunity', contrasts with the field's work in practice. Translated into practice, international criminal law is selectively enforced; whether they directly address it or not, international prosecutors often consider political factors such as prospects for state cooperation when they exercise their discretionary power. Limits posed by state sovereignty, disputes concerning venue -national or international -and financial considerations ensure that international criminal trials are unusual events, whether at ad hoc tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or before the permanent ICC.
To date, international judicial interventions have overwhelmingly occurred in the global South. 11 As of the time of writing, all suspects before the ICC have been from the African continent. Meanwhile, the court has not asserted jurisdiction over violations of 
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The ICC has exercised its jurisdiction in the 'situations' of northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, the Darfur region of Sudan, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and most recently Mali as of the time of writing. Ad hoc tribunals or special criminal divisions have been established to adjudicate violations of international criminal law committed in Rwanda (ICTR), the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Sierra Leone (SCSL), Lebanon (STL), Cambodia (ECCC), and most recently Bangladesh (ICT).
international criminal law allegedly committed in Palestine, leading some observers to contend that what the court frames as a technical jurisdictional matter is also a product of the political interests of strong states. 12 The United Nations Security Council features prominently in the production of these geographies, whether through founding tribunals (as was the case with Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) or through triggering the referral of a situation to the ICC through a resolution. The concerns of the permanent five members of the Security Council are reflected in the map of international judicial interventions, influencing where they do and do not take place.
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Against this backdrop of selective geographies, international judicial interventions have produced considerable resistance from states and regional bodies, particularly on the African continent. 14 These interventions have also produced claims that the field of international criminal law is either inherently political or has been politicised in practice.
Resistance to the ICC has been mobilised around assertions of sovereignty, not only because sovereignty serves as a foundational value of the international legal order but also due to its historical significance for postcolonial states. only determined by the imperative to prosecute 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community' but also by issues of political will, state cooperation, and protection of client states and state actors. 16 At stake then is not whether the field can be separated from 'the political', understood here as the powers and interests that invest and shape social interactions. In this sense, and contrasting sharply with assertions by the field's proponents that 'politics have no place' within it, the legal domain is another site of political contestation. This article considers the ways in which powers and interests are channeled, disavowed, and contested by different actors, often through appropriating the very terms of the field and its corresponding ontologies. the displacement of large sections of the Kenyan population -prompted substantial involvement from international and regional actors. deputy. They formed the Jubilee coalition in early December 2012, about three months before the election, which they symbolically enacted at a campaign rally through exchanging baseball caps from the other's respective party. In the space of roughly two years, these former rivals and their communities who had been violently opposed in the past appeared to have moved from antagonism to cooperation. As a civil society representative characterised it, 'two major antagonistic tribes -Kikuyu and Kalenjinwere united through the elections'. This narrative of unity from out of enmity was reflected in popular discourse. Newspaper accounts attributed the court with a causal power, suggesting that the ICC process had produced the political alliance. As early as July 2012, one paper reported that the election was being recast as a 'referendum on the Kenya cases', 37 which one observer noted was part of the campaign platform of the nascent Jubilee alliance toward the end of 2012.
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Headlines at that time announced that the ICC created a 'Coalition of the Accused'. be allegations of participation in Post-Election Violence', where it emphasised that 'it has at all times fully co-operated' with requests from the Court. The Kenyan government's efforts to have the ICC dismiss or defer the cases are extensively documented elsewhere 55 ; for the purposes of this article I primarily intend to highlight these ongoing tensions between cooperation and contestation in the Kenyan state's relationship to the ICC.
In addition to government efforts to resist ICC jurisdiction, there has been considerable regional and international involvement in response to the court's intervention in Kenya.
The genealogy of United Nations and African Union engagement with the Kenyan situation extends back to the period in which the alleged crimes were committed. 
it.'
72 A number of civil society proponents contested the claim that the Kenyan situation had generated a rift between the court and African states, noting instead the widespread support for the court on the continent and maintaining that the ICC's intervention in Kenya was domestically driven rather than an external imposition. These different discursive framings reflected broader contestations around whose agency generated the ICC intervention in Kenya, and in particular, whether it should be regarded as domestically driven or as an external imposition. opposed to deferral) of proceedings against Kenyan nationals in a confidential letter to the Security Council, invoking the sovereign right of UN states and arguing that 'Kenyans, in whom this sovereign right rests, spoke with a loud, clear, concise voice when they overwhelmingly elected Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as President and Deputy President respectively.'
75 Meanwhile, at the AU summit that month, a resolution regarding the ICC expressed 'concern with the misuse of indictments against African leaders'. 76 Although the resolution was brought by Uganda and South Sudan, Kenya circulated an aide memoire claiming that the prosecutor was contradicting the sovereign will of the people that had been expressed through the elections. 77 The Ethiopian Prime
Minister publicly stated that the ICC process 'has degenerated into some kind of race hunting.' participant claimed that the ICC 'has let the other side shape the narrative that it is a Western imposition,' and added, 'it is a powerful narrative that has played very well'.
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The Court's Office of the Prosecutor has also begun to publicly acknowledge the politicisation of the trials in Kenya. Referencing the AU resolution of May 2013, one filing noted that '[t]he Prosecution believes that the combined effect of this resolution and related media reports in the Kenyan press have served to further rally Kenyans against the Court by fostering the perception that the Court is a foreign entity that was imposed on Kenya by illegitimate, western, interests.' 95 At the opening of the case against Ruto and Sang, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda addressed these perceptions directly:
This is not a trial of Kenya or the Kenyan people. It is not about vindicating or indicating -indicting one or other ethnic group or political party. It is not about meddling in African affairs. This trial, Mr President, Your Honors, is about obtaining justice for the many thousands of victims of the post-election violence and ensuring that there is no impunity for those responsible, regardless of power or position. 96 As a rhetorical tactic, critics of the ICC intervention seek to substitute the individuals on trial for a broader entity -either the communities they are seen to represent or the By using the weight of the government to argue its case before the Security Council based on some vague, illusory threat that amounts to an extra-judicial request for impunity, Kenya's political elite is seeking to frame the ICC as having put the entire Kenyan state in the dock, rather than select individuals alleged to be responsible for the worst of the crimes committed during the post-election violence.
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The claims of ICC critics take for granted that Kenyatta and Ruto stand metonymically for a larger entity under threat -either their respective communities or Kenyan sovereignty. For ICC proponents, this is a manipulative category mistake -putting 'the entire Kenyan state in the dock' -whereas other African states and the African Union may regard the trials of Kenyan political leaders as representing a broader threat to African self-determination.
Conclusion
It is by democratic reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that one tries, most often to no avail, to impose limits on the sovereignty of nation-states. One example of this, among so many others, would be the laborious creation of an International Criminal Court. -Jacques Derrida Council reinscribes its own (sovereign) authority to determine the workings of a system that some of its members remain outside. What the Kenyan situation has produced, in
